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BOEING SYSTEM SIG CORE TEAM 
The System SIG activities at Boeing have been divided into five engineering 
disciplines; Electrical, Mechanical, Optics, Thermal, and Batteries/Solar Cells. 
Specific Boeing individuals have been assigned the responsibilities for activities that 
fall within each area. These individuals are shown on the accompanying chart. The 
specific tests that fall within each discipline are described in the LDEF Systems 
Special Investigation Group Plan (Ref 1). In general, the efforts of the System 
SIG will concentrate at the highest possible level of assemblage of subsystems and/or 
components to detect functional changes, degradation and/or failures. Failure 
analysis and further lower level testing will then be conducted. 
All LDEF hardware has been categorized by the Systems SIG into either 
Experimenter Systems on LDEF Systems. LDEF Systems are defined to be the 
hardware provided by the LDEF Project Office which performed a functional role 
during the LDEF mission in support of the experimenter's objectives. The 
Experimenter Systems are the hardware provided by the experimenter which 
performed a functional role in support of the experimentor's objectives. The majority of 
the hardware tested at Boeing and/or reported on in this document are LDEF Systems 
hardware. Data from testing of individual experimenter's hardware will be collated into 
the System SIG database as the test reports are received. 
Reference 1: Mason, J. B., Edelman, J.E., Dursch, H. W., LDEF Systems 
Special Investigation Group Investigation Plan, February 1990. 
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BOEING SYSTEM SIG CORE TEAM 
• Core Team Leader - Harry Dursch 
• Electrical - Emmett Miller 
• Mechanical - Dr. Steve Spear 
• Optics - Tim Majoch 
• Thermal- Dr. Wally Plagemann 
• Batteries/Solar Cells - Dr. Chris Johnson 
• Responsibilities include: 
• Support de-integration at KSC 
• Testing of hardware at Boeing 
• Review of PI test plans & test results 
• Support of test activities at PI labs 
• Collation of all test results into SSIG 
handbook/database 
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LDEF ENVIRONMENT 
LDEF was retrieved on January 12, 1990 after 70 months of exposure to 
LEO. LDEF was in a constant orientation relative to the RAM direction 
throughout its entire mission. This resulted in an excellent opportunity to 
map the effects of the various space environments on the systems and 
materials flown on LDEF. 
Representative temperatures shown on this chart are from two of the 
seven temperature sensors mounted on various locations on the LDEF 
internal structure. These temps are the max and min for the first 390 
days of flight (Ref. 2). Don Wilkes reports that one of the batteries 
mounted on the backside of his experiment (tray A9) had a max temp of 
81°F and a min of temp of 57°F over the first 600 days of the mission. 
The LDEF hardware located on the inside of LDEF was shielded from the 
UV radiation and atomic oxygen. Most electrical hardware was mounted 
on the interior and, therefore, saw a relatively benign space environment. 
The hardware mounted on the exterior surfaces was exposed to a variety 
of temperature, meteoroid and debris, UV radiation and atomic oxygen 
environments, dependent of its specific location and 
absorptance/emittance ratio 
Reference 2: Berrios, W. M., Long Duration Exposure Facility Post-Flight 
Thermal Analysis, OrbitalIThermal Environment Data Package, October, 
1990, NASA LaRC. 
Reference 3: See, T. et.al., Meteroid and Debris Impact Features 
Documented on LDEF, August 1990, NASA JSC. 
5 
I, 
Environment Seen by LDEF 
• Recovered from LEO after almost 6 years 
• Non-oscillatory attitude 
• Benign temperature environment 
• Interior surface temperature: 
• Earth end; 105°F max, 46°F min 
• Space end; 96°F max, 41°F min 
• Atomic oxygen flux vs time 
• Function of increasing solar flares and decreasing 
orbit 
• Meteoroid and space debris 
• ~ 3100 impacts> 0.5 mm (Ref. 3) 
• Ultra-violet radiation 
• Thermal cycling 
• ~ 34,000 orbits 
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LDEF ENVIRONMENT, ATOMIC OXYGEN 
The following chart shows the cumulative atomic oxygen fluence vs time 
for the LDEF mission (Ref. 4). The decaying orbit near the end of the 
mission and the increasing solar activity (the end of the LDEF mission 
occured near the peak of the 11 year solar cycle) caused the atomic 
oxygen flux to increase rapidly near the end of the mission. It is 
particularly significant that after almost four years into the LDEF mission, 
LDEF had received only 9% of its total atomic oxygen exposure; and that 
in the last year of the mission, LDEF received 780/0 of its atomic oxygen 
exposure. 
The environmental exposure control canisters (EECC) were opened 10 
days after deployment of LDEF and then closed 10 months later. The 
specimens within the EECC's saw only .... 30/0 of the total atomic oxygen 
fluence seen by adjoining hardware of LDEF. 
Reference 4: Bourassa, R. J., Gillis, J. R., Atomic Oxygen Flux and 
Fluence Calculation for Long Duration Exposure Facility, August 13, 
1990. (This activity was accomplished under Boeing's support of the 
Material's Special Investigation Group and is available upon request). 
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ATOMIC OXYGEN FLUENCE FOR EACH 
TRAY LOCATION 
The angle of incidence for each lDEF surface was fixed by 
its unique geometry and constant flight angle. Several 
independent methods have indicated yaw for lDEF was 
somewhere between 7 and 12 degrees. A yaw angle of 10 
degrees was selected for the calculations shown on this 
chart. 
The calculated fluence for the ram direction is 8.4/10 21 
atoms (impacts)/cm2 
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ATOMIC OXYGEN FLUENCES FOR EACH 
TRAY LOCATION 
RAM 
DIRECTION 
4 ... 
10 Degrees 
7.88E+21 
-z-axis , 8.27E+21 1· •••••• ·1 Row 
... 9 
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RAM DIRECTION FLUENCE: 8.40E+21 
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Row 
12 
Earth End View 
All Spacecraft End 
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LDEF DEINTEGRATION 
On-site support of the deintegration was provided from January 27, 1990 
through May 4, 1990. The following chart summarizes the activities. 
11 
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ofLDEFatKS 
~ I. In .. ~n~ !i'''Ul~lnn support starting with lDEF 
bia (1/27/90) through 
deintegration (5/4/90) 
• responsibility was to represent 
Systems SIG interests during deintegration 
4> On .. site functional testing of lDEF and PI's 
hardware 
.. Discussions of test plans with Pis 
.. Developed initial hardware testing 
prioritization 
.. Assisted in development of MOU's with Pis 
.. Packaging and shipping of selected hardware to Boeing 
12 
Systems SIG Preliminary Findings 
The following three charts summerize the Systems SIG findings 
to date. Each finding is discussed in further detail within this 
report. 
13 
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SYSTEMS SIG 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
• NO ELECTRICAL OR MECHANICAL SYSTEM LEVEL FAILURES ATIRIBUTED TO THE LEO SPACE 
ENVIRONMENT HAVE YET RFEN DETECTED 
• MOST SYSTEMS WORKED: RELATIVELY FEW FAILURES OCCURRED 
- LEO CONDITIONS PERMIT HIGH RELIABILITY/LONG TERM USE IF SYSTEMS ARE 
PROPERLY DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED, INTEGRATED, TESTED, AND SHIELDED 
- PRACTICAL LOW COST/HIGH RISK SPACE FLIGHT SYSTEMS WERE DEMONSTRATED 
• SOME LOW COST ELECTRICAUELECTRONIC COMPONENTS WERE USED SUCCESSFULLY 
- MAY BE POSSIBLE TO RELAX SOME RULES UNDER BENIGN CONDITIONS, IF PROPER 
TESTING, BACKUP SYSTEMS, AND SHIELDS PROVIDED (THERMAL, RADIATION. ATOMIC 
OXYGEN, DRIFT) 
- ADDITIONAL STUDY REQUIRED 
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SYSTEMS SIG 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (CONT.) 
.. EXTENSIVE CONTAMINATION AND MATERIAL DRIFTING, CONDUCTIVE MATERIALS ARE A 
POTENTIAL HAZARD: EXPOSED SENSORS, HV TERMINALS VULNERABLE 
- ADDITIONAL CONTROLS ON ALLOWABLE MATERIALS, AND ENCLOSURES TO CAPTURE 
(OR EXCLUDE) LOOSE MATERIALS MAY BE REQUIRED 
- EMPHASIZE CONTAMINATION CONTROL 
.. ELECTRICAL RELAYS ARE A CONTINUING PROBLEM AREA 
USE QUALIFIED VENDORS 
- INDIVIDUAL PART SCREENING AT LIMITS OF SPECIFIED VOLTAGES, PULSE vVIDTHS, 
TEMPERATURES, VIBRATION, ETC. 
- REDUNDANCY 
- ALTERNATIVE SWITCH TYPES IF FEASIBLE 
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SYSTEMS SIG 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (CO NT.) 
e NO EVIDENCE OF COLD-WELDING DUE TO SPACE EXPOSURE 
• DIFFICULT FASTENER REMOVAL APPARENTLY RELATED TO GALLING DAMAGE DURING 
INSTALLATION 
- INTEGRATION PROCEDURES MUST BE SCRUTINIZED 
- STAINLESS STEELS ARE VERY SUSCEPTIBLE TO GALLING 
- SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION REQUIRES HIGH THREAD QUALITY AND APPROPRIATE 
LUBRICATION SCHEMES 
- ADDIl IONAl STUDY REQUIRED 
• NO BULK METAllURGICAL CHANGES IN ALUMINUM OR TITANIUM MATERIALS DUE TO SPACE· 
EXPOSURE 
• VISCOUS DAMPER DEMONSTRATED AS VIABLE AnlTUDE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR SPACE 
STATION SEGMENTS 
18 
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Anomalies - LDEF Systems 
This chart lists the major anomalies possessed by the various 
LDEF systems. The results, to date, from testing and analysis to 
understand the cause and effect of these anomalies, are 
discussed within this report. 
19 
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ANOMALIES 
LDEF SYSTEMS 
PRIMARY STRUCTURE 
END SUPPORT BEAM AND KEEL TRUNNION 
TRAY CLAMPS 
G ALLING OF MATING SURFACES 
CHANGES IN CHROMIC ACID ANODIZE ALUMINUM 
TRAY CLAMP FASTENERS 
PNENOLIC SPACERS 
WASHERS 
EXPERIMENT FASTENERS 
ALL FIVE OPENED 
LIS02 
LICF 
S 0014 
S 0069 
M 0003 
FIVE OF SEVEN UNITS 
RELAY 
FASTENERS 
EXTENSIVE GALLING, SEVERE THREAD DAMAGE 
DIMENSIONAL CHANGE I LOW REMOVAL TORQUES 
BONDED TO BASE PLATE 
GALLING, BONDING, SHEARING 
ENVIRONMENT EXPOSURE CONTROL CANJSTER lEECC) 
MECHANISM SPEED VARIATIONS 
ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE IN TWO UNITS 
BATTERIES 
ONE LEAKING CELL 
DIMETHYL SULFATE GAS LEAKS 
MAGNETIC TAPE MQDJJldE (MTM) 
SIGNS OF VIBRATION ON TAPE 
RELAY MALFUNCTION 
POSSIBLE MOTOR BEARING NOISE 
T APE MECHANICAL SET 
EXPERIMENT INITIATE SYSTEM (EIS} 
UNUSED STATUS INDICATOR DID NOT OPERATE 
20 
Anomalies - Experiment Systems 
This chart lists the major anomalies possessed by the various 
Experiment Systems. The status of the failure analysis being 
performed on A0038 and AO 187 -1 is discussed on pages 57-70 
and 71-74 respectively. All other anomalies are being 
investigated by the respective principal investigations. The 
System SIG will monitor this testing and analysis, provide 
assistance as needed, and document'report the results as they 
are received. 
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A 0038 
A 0054 
A 0076 
A 0133 
A 0171 
A 0175 
A 0180 
A 0187·1 
ANOMALIES 
EXPERIMENT SYSTEMS 
ONE RELAY FAILURE; A 0201 
SEVERE CONTAMINATION AND 
UNUSUAL PATTERNS ON ALL FOUR 
TRAYS; M 0004 
ONLY ONE OF 35 FOILS OPENED; 
FIVE OF SEVENTY MICRO· 
COULOMBMETERS (E·CELLS) M 0006 
LEAKED 
EVIDENCE OF ELECTROSTATIC S 0014 
DISCHARGE 
PREMATURE SHUTOFF (40 DA YS S 0069 
VS. 100 DAYS OF DATA) 
ELECTRONICS ODOR; SHEARED 
BOLTS 
SPECIMEN RETAINING HARDWARE S 1001 
FROZEN IN PLACE 
SEVERE FASTENER GALLING 
S 1005 
ELECTRONICS ODOR; 
Loss OF TAPE OXIDE ADHESION IN 
DRY NITROGEN 
CLAM SHELLS WERE NOT CLOSED 
ON RETRIEVAL; 
INITIAL ATTEMPT TO CLOSE WAS 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
22 
SUN SENSOR SATURATION; 
ERRATIC CMOS SENSOR DATA 
ApPARENT "CORROSION" AROUND 
BOLT HEADS 
OUTER COVER BOLTS SHEARED 
DURING DISMANTLING 
GULTEN POWER SUPPLY UNIT 
FAILURE DURING BENCH TEST 
R ELA Y FAiLURE; 
BINDING CAROUSEL MECHANISM; 
MALFUNCTION OF DEUTERIUM 
LAMPj 
CLOCK BIT LATCH UP 
DID NOT ACHIEVE LOW 
TEMPERATURE REQUIRED FOR 
OPERATION 
SIGNS OF INTERNAL 
MALFUNCTION; 
RADIATION SHIELDS CRACKED; 
MTM NOT STOPPED AS EXPECTED 
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PRECEDiNG flAG!::: FilM£D 
ELECTRICAL OBJECTIVES 
LDEF incorporated a considerable variety of electrical systems. Some were supplied 
by NASA, either as standalone units (e.g. Experiment Initiate System, "EIS") or to be 
utilized within experimenter's trays (Experiment Power and Data System, "EPDS"). 
Many other systems were designed and built by the experimenters, to a variety of 
specifications for part procurement and system test. These included many 
commercial quality parts, often with limited or no screeing tests. In general, these 
were used for control and data collection purposes rather than as integral parts of the 
experiment. Therefore they were generally protected from direct exposure to the 
external environment, and are probably representative of similar systems used on 
many other spacecraft. The major differences between LDEF systems and those of 
other programs follow from the low cost approach utilized both by NASA and the 
expenmenters, and the length of time systems were exposed to low earth orbital 
conditions. Examples of the low cost approach include the use of commercial or 
Class B components instead of Class S and the absence of thermallvacuum testing 
on some of the hardware flown on LDEF. 
27 
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OBJECTIVES 
e Determine effects of LDEF exposure on electrical 
systems & components 
III Evaluate performance of LDEF systems: 
derive lessons learned 
28 
SUMMARY OF SYSTEMS FLOWN 
The EIS was essential for turning on all active experiments, as no internal 
timers were utilized as backup. Although simple in concept, consisting of 
timers and sequencers to activate latching relays in the 24 experiments, it 
also incorporated feedback to latching visual indicators, including six on 
the LDEF exterIor. These six were utilized by the astronauts during 
initial launch and activation to verify successful initiate operation. 
The EPDS was the only NASA-supplied electronic 
flown at various locations on the spacecraft. 
types of input data and timing) varied between 
experiment requirements, all utilized the same 
cards, and the same tape recorder. 
system with multiple units 
Although programming (for 
units, depending upon 
logic, control and memory 
The wire harness was assembled in place on the spacecraft, rather than 
being built and tested separately. Construction incorporated multiple TFE 
insulated wires and nylon cable ties, with connectors typical of current 
practice. 
A number of experiments incorporated data collection and control systems, 
either to interface with the EPDS, or utilizing independant data storage 
units. These were designed by the experimenters or their selected 
contractors. Designs were reviewed by NASA for safety and absence of 
interference with other LDEF systems, but not for their ability to meet the 
experimenter's objectives. 
29 
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S YOFSYSTEMS 
fII Experiment Initiate System (EIS) 
• 1 system with 24 outputs to turn experiment timers 
on/off 
• Experiment Power and Data System (EPDS) 
• 7 units flown (six experiments) 
I) CMOS logic and memory: MIL-STD-883 Class B 
fII Magnetic Tape Recorder (MTM) 
• Wire Harness 
• EIS to all active experiments 
• Some inter:-tray cabling 
• Individual Experiment Systems 
• Many experiments contained systems or 
components of interest 
30 
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THE EIS CONTOL BOX 
The EIS control circuitry was housed in this aluminum enclosure, located on 
the interior structure of LDEF. It was protected from direct exposure to 
the exterior by the LDEF frame structure and the experiment trays. The 
cabling shown is typical of the LDEF wire harness construction, with 
extensive use of tie wraps and clamps to the frame. Visual status 
indicators were located on the right side of the box (not visible in 
photograph) . 
31 
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OR~G~Nl\l PAGE IS 
Of QUALITY 
TYPICAL EPDS MOUNTING. 
The principal EPDS components are shown in the upper right corner of this 
tray, consisting of the DPCA (Data Processor and Control Assembly) and the 
MTM (Magnetic Tape Module). These, together with associated batteries, 
were mounted on a one-third-tray size plate, with the space side (hidden) 
protected with an aluminum and fiberglass shield. 
33 
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SUMMARY OF COMPONENTS FLOWN 
These charts are included to give an overview of the very wide variety of 
electrical and electronic components utilized on LDEF. Since design and 
fabrication occurred in the late 1970's, some more recent part catagories 
are not replesented (e.g. large SRAM's, 16 or 32 bit microprocessors, 
etc.). However, the technology incorporated in many of the latest 
microelectronic components is represented in the LDEF components, and many 
of these are still in current use for new designs. 
A more detailed list of hardware flown is available on request. 
35 
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SUMMARY OF COMPONENTS FLOWN 
• Microcircuits 
• Analog and digital (mostly MIL-STD-883, Class B, 
or commercial): CMOS, LS logic 
• Discrete: 
• Relays, indicators, C's, R's 
• Materials: 
• Circuit boards, conformal coatings, potting 
compounds, shields 
• High voltage supplies: to 1 kV 
• Fiber Optics 
• Optical Couplers 
• Solar Cells 
• Batteries: LiS02, NiCd, LiCF 
36 
DEINTEGRATION OBJECTIVES 
Prior to and during deintegration at KSC, numerous activities took place 
under System SIG oversight. The objective was to assure that all 
information of potential value was recovered prior to any activities which 
might destroy such information. Emphasis was placed on documentation of 
the condition and operational status of LDEF and experiment systems as 
early as possible after LDEF was moved to SAEF2, and on providing 
guidelines to experimenters for inspection and testing during follow-on 
activities. 
37 
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DEINTEGRATION OBJECTIVES 
• Document condition and status of systems 
prior to removal: 
• EIS status indicators 
• Experiment initiate relays 
• High voltages off 
• Visual inspections 
• Prevent inadvertent damage or 
undocumented changes: 
• ESD protection and handling 
• Prevent loss of non-experiment data 
• Standard test plans 
• Preservation of hardware 
• Non-interference with experiment objectives 
38 
KSC TESTS AND RESULTS 
The six external EIS status indicators had indicated successful experiment 
initiation at deployment in 1984. In a change to the original plan, the 
EIS was not reset at recovery, to prevent accidental or unpredictable 
effects associated with discharged batteries or the extended orbital 
period. An early activity at KSC was therefore to verify that all 
experiment initiate relays were still in the "SET" state (experiment turned 
on), and that the used status indicators on the EIS box were in their 
correct SET state. This was followed by thorough visual inspection in-
place, and later by functional testing at KSC after removal from LDEF. The 
EIS apparantly performed flawlessly during flight. The only significant 
anomaly observed was the failure of one unused status indicator to function 
the first time it was exercised. This is of concern due to the reliance on 
similar indicators to signal experiment tUrn-on during launch. Failure of 
any of the external status indicators would have caused considerable 
inconvenience and lost time in verifying initiation at that time. 
Two of the EPDS units were exercised at KSC during testing of their 
associated experiments. Both appeared to function normally, although 
certain anomalies were observed which required later study at the 
experimenter's facility. 
39 
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KSC TESTS AND RESUL TS 
• Experiment Initiate System (EIS) 
• Status indicators: all were SET 
• Experiment initiate relays: all SET 
• Cables and connectors: all nominal 
• Functional test: one unused status indicator 
failed first SET test 
• Experiment Power and Data Systems (EPDS) 
• System functional tests, with EPDS current 
measurements 
• M0004: apparent anomalies, later explained 
(not failures) 
• S 1001: normal operation (including solar 
arrays) 
40 
POST-DEINTEGRATION FINDINGS: EIS 
The EIS control box was examined internally at NASA Langley Research 
Center. This was the first LDEF electronic system examined in this manner, 
and serves at a reference point for future examinations of EPDS units and 
others. No degradation or significant anomalies were observed on any of 
the internal components or circuit cards. Minor anomalies, including 
debris from initial assembly and a loose connector clamp ring, were 
observed, but these would not have resulted in any degradation of 
performance. However, they do point to the importance of meticulous 
handling and cleaning of space hardware. Obviously, debris which was 
electrically conducting (not observed in EIS) could cause major problems 
while drifting during weightlessness. 
Failure analysis of the faulty EIS status indicator was performed at 
Boeing. The failing unit and others were tested under marginal voltage and 
pulse width conditions. This type of testing, at the limits of the 
manufacturer's specifications, is an effective means of detecting a variety 
of problems in electromechanical devices. The marginal voltage/pulse width 
testing confirmed the faulty operation, and internal inspection revealed a 
non-conducting particle which was the probable cause of failure. It is 
strongly suggested that similar marginal testing be performed at the part 
level on all such devices (100% of flight units) prior to future flight 
applications. 
41 
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POST-DEINTEGRA TION FINDINGS: 
EIS 
.. Internal inspection: no degradation 
.. Loose clamp ring on connector 
• Failed status indicator: probable particle-
induced intermittency, detectable by 
testing at low voltage, minimum pulse 
width 
42 
POST-INTEGRATION FINDINGS: EPDS 
To date (October, 1990), only one of the seven EPDS units has exhibited any 
significant problems, and all performed satisfactorily during the LDEF flight. During 
testing at the M0003 experimenter's facility one of two EPDS units went into a 
continuous data record/tape record mode at the end of the first programmed record 
period. The other unit, similarily programmed, performed normally. This failure did 
not occur during flight, and flight data was not affected. Limited testing at the 
experimenter's facility did not reveal the cause of failure. The unit was shipped to 
Boeing. Failure analysis testing showed the problem to be an intermittant short in one 
of the GSE cable connectors, not in any of the flight hardware. 
The apparent high standby current observed on the M0004 unit at KSC was traced to 
a previously unrecognized experiment turn-on operation when the EPDS was first 
activated by the EIS. This was caused by a pulse generated by the EPDS, and could 
have been eliminated by a minor circuit modification, as discussed in the "fine print" of 
the EPDS manual. No problems with experiment operation or flight data resulted. 
Although not a serious problem, this does indicate the need for careful testing and 
documentation of all system parameters during preflight checkout, including monitoring 
of all interface signals to detect such anomalous pulses. 
A high supply current condition was experienced on the data system utilized on 
experiment S0014 during initial turn-on at the experimenter's facility, preventing EPDS 
testing. The problem had been encountered before, during preflight testing, and 
occurred again at the manufacturer's laboratory. However, no fault was found and the 
unit subsequently performed normally. This type of behavior is typical of the latchup 
phenomenom, but the actual cause has not identified. Additional system level tests 
are planned. 
43 . 
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POST-DEINTEGRA TION FINDINGS: 
EPDS 
• M0003: 1 of 2 EPDS was thought to have 
failed: appeared to be locked into continuous data 
record mode 
• Flight data apparently not affected 
.. Failure analysis showed problem was 
related to G8E, there were no flight 
hardware failures 
.. M0004: High standby current traced to early 
turn-on of experiment, not a failure 
.. Relay chatter due to G8E timing 
• 80014: Not yet tested (Gulten data system 
problem: high current) 
• Complete system test planned 
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POST-DEINTEGRATION FINDINGS: EPDS (CONTINUED) 
Several other anomalies involving experimenter electronics remaln to be 
analyzed. Some are apparantly recurrences of problems which were noted 
during preflight testing (e.g. the Gulten data system). In addition, some 
systems have not yet completed their post-flight test programs. Following 
this operational test phase, the present plan is to test all EPDS units for 
parametric shifts, and to perform an internal inspection, to determine if 
any changes related to the LDEF flight occurred. 
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POST-DEINTEGRA TION FINDINGS: 
EPDS 
• S1 001: System test planned 
• S1 005: Limited system test: normal 
• Complete thermal-vacuum testing planned 
• A0201: Test plan not yet finalized 
Present plans are to test all EPDS at Boeing 
for changes in sensitive parameters, and 
inspect for changes related to LDEF 
experience 
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MAGNET TAPE MODULE (MTM) 
Seven two-track MTM's were supplied by NASA as part of the EPDS units. A single four-track 
MTM was also utilized on another experiment. Flight data was recovered from all units. 
However, the four-track unit failed to switch to the second set of tracks after completion of its 
first set, resulting in overwriting some of the early data. Failure analysis will be performed. 
All other units functioned normally, with only minor anomalies noted. However, two effects of 
long term storage of the magnetic tape were noted. On those units which sat for an extended 
period without being operated after completion of their programmed mission, the tape took a 
"set" where it wrapped around the non-metallic capstan (but not elsewhere). In addition, it 
was noted that similar tape stored in dry nitrogen on earth exhibited a loss of adhesion of the 
magnetic oxide material. Dry nitrogen storage is not a preventive for material degr-etlan. 
Fortunately, this did not occur in the flight units, which had some internal humidity or other 
gaseous contamination. 
These findings will be investigated by the MTM or tape manufacturer, respectively and should 
be be of value in planning future long term missions. 
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Magnetic Tape Systems (MTM) 
• Data recovered from aU recorders 
e Relay failure on 4 .. track MTM 
e Tape took "set" around non-metallic capstan 
in six of seven 2 .. track recorders. Exception 
was the only unit which operated periodically 
throughout the mission 
o A0180 tape stored in dry nitrogen on ground 
exhibited loss of oxide adhesion on replay. 
Similar tape in sealed flight unit did not show 
adhesion loss 
• Capstan motor brush or bearing noise on one 
unit 
• All electromechanical systems functions were 
nominal in post-flight bench tests 
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WIRE HARNESSING: COMPONENTS AND CONSTRUCTION 
The LDEF wire harness consisted of the cabling between the EIS box and all 
24 actlve experiments, some inter-experlment cabling, battery cabllng, and 
thermocouple wlrlng. It was assembled in-place in the LDEF structure, wlth 
extensive use of Nylon cable ties and harness clamps. At KSC, it was 
lnspected In-place prlor to any dlsrupt~on other than dlsconnection of 
experl~ents. After removal of the experIments, electrlcal contlnulty and 
500 volt DC lnsulatlon reslstance tests were performed on the harness.It 
was then removed Intact, and several EIS harness assemblys were removed for 
further detalled inspectlons and tests at Boeing. Construction and 
components were typical of current practice, except that some of the 
connectors did not recelve a vacuum bakeout. No problems resulted from 
thls condltlon. 
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Wire Harnessing: 
Components and Construction 
• Some connectors contained non-space rated 
polymeric materials (no vacuum bake) 
• EIS cabling: Teflon jacketed, braided copper 
shielded cable comprised of 7,20 gauge, teflon 
insulated, copper conductors 
It Cable harness clamps and cable ties: Nylon 
50 
TYPICAL t'iIRE HARNESS INSTALLATION 
Special clamps were fabricated to provide attachment points on the LDEF 
frame without drilling holes into structural members. The harness made 
numerous bends over structural members, with extensive use of clamps and 
Teflon jacketing for protection. 
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TESTING PERFORMED 
Electrical and mechanical tests were performed to detect any deterioration 
or breakdown. When appropriate, these were pertormed while the harness was 
still in place in LDEF, prior to any movement which might have disturbed or 
corrected shorting conditions. 
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WIRE HARNESSING 
TESTING PERFORMED 
• Electrical testing 
• DC resistance 
• Insulation resistance 
• Dielectric withstand voltage 
• Contact resistance of the crimped contact 
wire junction 
• Mechanical testing (connectors) 
• Contact insertion and removal forces 
• Socket engagement and separation forces 
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TEST RESULTS 
The entire wire harness performed flawlessly. No deterioration of any 
components or degradation of electrical properties was observed. It should 
be noted that the wire harness was not directly exposed to the external 
environment (notably atomic oxygen), being protected by the experiment 
trays (metal) and the LDEF frame structure. 
Exposed wiring on some experiments was subject to some deterioration of the 
exterior sheath ma~erials. The results of this exposure will be documented 
by the system SIG. 
A copy of the wire harness test report is available on request. 
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WIRE HARNESS 
TEST RESUL TS 
• Visual examination: no deterioration of wire 
harness components 
• Electrical testing: no degradation of the electrical 
properties of the cabling 
• Mechanical evaluation: reveals all components 
intact and fully functional 
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A0038 - INTERSTELLAR GAS EXPERIMENT (IGE) 
A0038 was one of the most complex experiments on LDEF; it also experienced 
the only major electronic systems failure. Seven "cameras" each containing 
five copper-beryllium foils, were to collect gas atoms. The foils were to 
be sequentially rotated out of theIr exposed position by firing pyrotechnic 
"squibs" when pulsed by their electronic sequencer units. It was found 
that only one of the 35 foils had rotated during flight. The experiment 
also used "E-cell" micro-coulombmeter units to record the length of time 
high voltage had been applied to the camera grids. A number of these E-
cells apparantly leaked, destroying their sockets with the corrosive 
internal electrolyte. FailUre analysis of the electronic systems is being 
conducted at Boeing, and preliminary findings are presented on the 
following pages. 
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A0038 .. INTERSTELLAR GAS EXPERIMENT 
G Objective: collect interstellar gas atoms in 
Cu-8e foils 
It Four trays with total of seven "cameras". Each 
camera contained five foils designed to rotate from 
horizontal to vertical in programmed sequence. 1200 
volt ion suppression grids. 
• Sequencer pulses pyrotechnic, cuts wire causing foil 
to rotate 
• Only one of the 35 foils rotated 
• Severe contamination on exterior surfaces 
• Several E-cells (coulombmeters) leaked: 
• sockets destroyed 
• Failure analysis being performed at Boeing 
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SPACE END OF LDEF, ~HTH TWO IGE TRAYS PLUS OTHERS 
This in-orbit photo shows two of the four IGE trays, each containing two 
cameras. The IGE cameras (angled box enclosures) contained the flat foil 
plates, each hinged along one bottom edge and intended to rotate toward the 
front of the camera box, stopping when parallel to the box sides and out of 
the direct path of gas atoms traveling through the camera to the next foil 
in the sequence. 
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REAR OF ONE OF THEIGE TRAYS 
Shown are the batteries and sequencers (diagonal corners), and the backs of 
two cameras with associated high voltage power supplies. 
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A0038 - FAILUR~ ANALYSIS OBSERVATIONS 
The experiment systems were activated by the EIS system, which operated a 
single master initiate relay. This was found to be activated ("set"), and 
six of the seven slave relays (activated from the master relay) were set. 
One slave relay did not activate during flight and its sequencer (tray F6) 
was never turned on. Intermittent operation of the F6 slave relay has been 
confirmed. The remaining six sequencers had been activated in flight, but 
only one of the squibs fired. 
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A0038 - FAILURE ANALYSIS OBSERVATIONS 
• EIS activated master relay which was to activate 
slave relays in the seven sequencers 
• Six of seven sequencers activated but only one of 
. 35 pyros fired 
• Seventh sequencer (tray FS) never activated in 
flight. Relay worked in post-flight testing at KSC, 
failed once in lab 
• Problem with drive circuit, connector, or relay? 
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A0038 - FAILURE ANALYSIS OBSERVATIONS (CONTINUED) 
There was an LDEF requirement that electronic systems be isolated 
electrically from the LDEF structure. However, at least two experiments 
(including IGE) were evidently designed to use the LDEF as a ground 
reference. The IGE electronics were indeed isolated from the tray 
structure, but the various chassis boxes and the camera box structure were 
bolted directly to the tray. This made the tray the ground reference point 
for one of the camera internal grids. Neither electrical terminal of the 
high voltage power supply was connected to the tray, resulting in 
uncertainty as to the actual voltage between the camera grids and the 
camera body. Also, in a late pre-flight change for thermal control 
purposes, the sequencer chassis were isolated from the trays by insulating 
washers. 
Despite the grounding confusion, all electrical systems had ground return 
leads in their cabling, which completed the circuits and allowed them to 
function. Testing at Boeing confirmed that all sequencers and high 
voltage supplies functioned normally, using flight cables and accererated 
clock timing. Confirming activation of the trays, all batteries except 
that of the tray with the faulty initiate relay (F6) were fully discharged, 
as expected. 
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A0038 - FAILURE ANALYSIS OBSERVATIONS 
It E-cells record integrated currents 
• some apparently leaked, destroying sockets 
It Electronics isolated electrically from chassis and trays 
.. All sequencers and HV supplies pass functional tests 
It fired pyro simulators (flash cubes) 
It timing sequences correct 
It all batteries (except FS) discharged (HV turned on) 
It FS's battery at 70% of capacity 
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PHOTOGRAPH OF THE EffECTS OF E-CELL LEAKAGE 
This photograph shows the interior of two of the four high voltage power 
supplies (HVPS) that contained failed E-cells (the photograph was taken 
after the E-cells had been remoVed). Each of the seven HVPS used on 
A0038 contained ten E-cells. A total of five of the seventy E-cells 
showed signs of electrolyte (phosphoric acid) leakage. The 
_ disintegration of the sockets was apparently caused by the electrolyte 
leakage. 
Four of the seven HVPS were mounted on the exterior surfaces of the 
experiment while the remaining three were mounted on interior (inside of 
LDEF) surfaces. All four exterior HVPS experienced at least one E-cell 
failure while the interior mounted HVPS possessed no failed E-cells. 
This leads us to believe that operating temperatures played an important 
role in the E-celileakages. 
The leakages did not seem t6 effect the overall performance of the 
individual HVPS, but further testing is required to confirm this. 
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A0038 - FAILURE ANAL YSIS PLANS 
This analysis is still in progress. A number of unanswered questions 
remain, given that the electronic sequencers operate normally in the laboratory. 
Testing of control and flight squibs, including the two squib that did fire, is underway at 
the JSC Pyrotechnic Test Lab. Non-destructive testing will include; photography, 
weights, resistance, X-rays at two angles, and N-rays at two angles. Destructive testing 
will be performed if required. If the squibs appear to operate normally, additional testing 
of the electronic systems, including a reassembled tray and real time testing may be 
required. These may include examination of possible noise effects on the internal clocks 
(e.g. inadvertent reset operations). 
The effect of the floating high voltage ground needs study to assist in interpreting the 
results on those foils which were exposed during flight. In addition, it is desirable to 
complete the failure analyses on the E-cells and relay, to determine conclusively 
whether these anomalies were results of the LDEF orbit exposure. 
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A0038 ... FAILURE ANAL YSIS PLANS 
• Why did pyros not fire? 
• Inspect and test flight and control hardware 
e Joint effort with JSC 
• Why did E-cells leak? 
• How long were HV supplies on? 
\9 Battery usage vs actual current drains 
• Read E-cells 
• Why did F6 relay fail? 
• What was the effect of floating ground? 
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A0187-l CHEMISTRY OF MICROMETEOROIDS 
The experiment utilized sets of foil collector plates hinged along one side 
and controlled to open or close in a clam shell fashion. They were 
launched in the closed position. During flight they were to open for 300 
days, and then close. On recovery they were found to be open. Preliminary 
analysis shows there was no stop designed into the timer sequence, since 
the original LDEF mission was to have only lasted 18 months. It appears 
that there was sufficient battery life to operate the clamshells more than 
once, and they happened to be open at the time of recovery due to the 
programmed open-close time periods. Failure analysis will be performed to 
verify the results of this preliminary analysis. 
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A0187-1 CHEMISTRY ETEROIDS 
• Objective: obtain chemical analysis of meteoroids 
• Two sets of clam shells launched in closed position, 
programmed to open after 10 days and then close again 
prior to retrieval 
• LDEF retrieved with clam shells in open position 
• Had to bypass sequencer to electrically close 
clamshells at KSC and JSC - why? 
., Sequencer at Boeing for failure analysis 
., Analysis of schematic shows no stop in sequencer: clam 
shells kept cycling (308 days open, 212 days closed) 
• Failure analysis to verify failure mode 
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A0187-1 TRAY IN ORBIT, WITH CLAMSHELLS OPEN 
The two rows of four foils are each hinged along their longitudinal axis, 
and would have folded together prior to recovery if the intented sequence 
had been followed. 
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FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES 
This tentative listing of planned activities is subject to change. It is 
presented to suggest the types of studies which are needed to determine 
whether any orbit-related changes in hardware took place. These include 
completion of failure analyses on all reported failures, and detailed 
parametric measurements on those systems for which adequate preflight 
documentation exists. It is possible that significant changes may have 
occurred in certain components without causing a functional failure~ Any 
such changes would be of considerable interest and potential value in 
predicting usable lifetimes of similar electronic systems. 
It was recognized early in the LDEF program that many systems would not 
utilize fully space qualified components, due to the low budget nature of 
the program and similar constraints on the individual experimenters. In 
spite of these limitations, most systems worked as planned. Many of the 
observed anomalies were related to design limltations rather than component 
failures. This raises the fundamental question: To what extent is it 
necessary to utilize Class S or equivalent components, with their 
considerable cost penalty? 
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FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES 
• Failure Analysis (FA): 
• Completion of two experiment systems 
(A0038, A0187-1) 
• EPDS: 
• Inspection and testing: look for any 
indication of changes related to LDEF 
• Possible detailed component studies if 
changes are detected 
• Evaluation: 
• Compare results obtained with unscreened 
components (mostly MIL-STD 883, Class 8) 
with normal NASA requirements 
• Monitor testing of PI hardware 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
Although shielding from extended exposure to atomic oxygen and other 
environmental effects is important, no failures occurred which indicate any 
new, fundamental limitations to extended mission lifetimes. The key 
requirement (in addition to following good design practices) seems to be 
the system test plan. Testing of components at temperature, voltage and 
timing limits, and extensive testing of systems (including thermal-vacuum 
and noise tolerance testing) is essential. This must include thorough 
documentation, particularly of the interfaces between systems, and special 
efforts to detect unanticipated noise or spurious signals which can affect 
system timing or operation. 
Extensive outgassing and atomic oxygen effects were observed on many 
experiments and on the LDEF structure. Use of metallized Teflon and other 
films resulted in quantities of loose, conductive material which could 
cause problems in some systems. This area requires considerably more 
investigation, including long term degradation studies and controls on 
allowable materials for long mission lifetimes. 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
• Most systems worked: relatively few failures 
occurred 
• LEO conditions permit long term use if 
systems are properly designed, manufactured, 
tested, and shielded 
• Material outgassing and drifting, conductive 
materials are a potential hazard: exposed 
sensors, HV terminals vulnerable 
• Additional controls on allowable materials, and 
enclosures to capture (or exclude) loose 
materials may be required 
• Emphasize contamination control 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS (CONTINUED) 
Relays are a continuing problem area, well known in many production 
situations. Efforts have been made in some programs to eliminate them 
entirely, substituting solid state switches or other design approaches. 
There does not seem to be any magic answer. Typical approaches to 
minimizing these problems are listed. 
The question of when to permit use of commercial or MIL-STD parts in space 
applications is complex, involving many concerns and tradeoffs. However, 
it is evident that such components can survive in some (perhaps many) space 
missions. It seems likely that such useage may be permitted in non-mission 
critical applications if conservative design rules are followed and 
comprehensive system testing is conducted. Further study is suggested. 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
• Relays are a continuing problem area 
• Use qualified vendors 
• Individual part screening at limits of specified 
voltages, pulse widths, temperatures, 
vibration, etc. 
• Redundancy 
• Alternative switch types if feasible 
• Some low cost components were used successfully 
• May be possible to relax some rules under benign 
conditions, if proper testing, backup systems, and 
shields provided (thermal, radiation, atomic oxygen) 
• Additional study required 
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OBJECTIVES 
The primary objectives of the System SIG mechanical systems 
investigations are to determine the effects of long-term space exposure on 
(1) mechanisms employed both on LDEF or as part of individual 
experiments, (2) structural components and (3) fasteners. One of the most 
important objectives is to examine if space exposure will cause 
cold-welding problems with structural materials and fasteners to be used in 
assembled structures. This type of information is particularly important for 
successful Space Station Freedom (SSF) design. Specific components 
used on the SSF, such as orbital replacement units (ORUs), will require 
periodic replacement or repair. Any bonding or adhesion of the OR Us 
fastener assemblies will make on-orbit removal difficult. 
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ECHANICAL OBJECTIVES 
Determine effects of long term space exposure on 
• Mechanical systems and components 
• Structural materials 
• Fasteners 
Mechanisms 
• Evaluate functional performance 
• Characterize condition of motors, bearings, lubricants 
seals, gaskets, etc. 
Structures 
• Areas of interest include erosion, wear, condition of 
welds, and microstructure changes 
Fasteners 
• Determine if relaxation, cold-welding or galling occured 
• Develop requirements for pre-flight installation practices 
to insure successful on-orbit or post-flight removal 
• Does long term space exposure increase susceptibility to 
cold-welding? 
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Mechanical Systems Hardware 
of Interest Flown on lDEF 
Detailed lists of mechanical hardware flown on LDEF are available upon 
request. 
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MEC. SJr"fA 
OF!. 
1CAL SYSTEMS HARDWARE 
'REST FLOWN ON LDEF 
• Structures 
• Primary structure 
• 6061-T6 Aluminum 
• Ti and stainless steel components 
• Fasteners, trunnions, end support beam 
• Mechanisms 
• Environment exposure control canisters (EECC) 
• Lubricants 
• Seals 
• Drive motor, drive screw, bearings 
• Circuit boards, electronics 
• Harnessing 
• Fasteners 
• Motors 
• Seals 
• Valves 
• Lubricants 
• Instrumentation 
• Miscellaneous 
• Including bearings, springs, gears, washers, cable cutters, 
pyrotechnics 
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• Fasteners 
.. Tray clamp mounting bolts 
• Experiment mounting bolts 
• Intercostai fastener as-assembled 
• EECC canisters 
• Supported opening of all five canisters 
• End Support Beam spindle 
• Structural Materials 
• Metallurgical analysis 
• 6061-T6 aluminum primary structure 
• As represented by tray mounting clamps· 
• Stainless steels 
• Tray mounting bolts 
• ESB spindle 
• Ti-6AI-4 V intercostal clips 
• Cu grounding straps 
• Grapples } 
Funded by JSC 
• Viscous damper 
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EECC 
Dr. Steve Spear of Boeing and Dr. Dave Brinza of JPL assisted in the 
opening of all five EECC vacuum canisters flown on LDEF. This include 
on-site technical support in the openings of the Air Force (M0006), LaRC 
(S0010) and The Aerospace Corporation (M0003) canisters. Technical 
information to assist opening of the West German canister was provided. 
Information obtained of particular interest to System SIG objectives 
included canister pressures, leak rates, and drive motor currents during 
opening to evaluate effects of space exposure on the drawer actuation 
mechanism. 
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EECC 
• Participated in opening M0006, S001 0, M0003 canisters 
• Provided technical support for opening of S1 002 canisters 
• In conjunction with Dr. Dave Brinza of JPL obtained: 
• Initial canister pressures 
• Leak rates 
• Internal gas samples 
• Drawer opening times 
• Drive motor currents 
90 
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EECC 
Photograph shows the EECC as mounted.in an experiment tray. 
Drawer actuator is noted. Radiative heat shields cover the canister and 
drawer front to control the content's thermal exposure and protect the 
drawer sealing mechanisms. 
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EECC Performance Data 
Data obtained during opening of the EECC vacuum canisters is shown. 
Due to GSE difficulties, the initial pressure data was not obtained for the 
M0006 canister. However, it was determined during the opening of the 
M0006 canister that a significant pressure differential existed. The S1 002 
experimenters stated that "we did not observe a pressure differential 
between the canister and ambient pressure" during the opening of their 
canister. The M0003 canister flown near the trailing edge of LDEF was 
holding a significant vacuum at the time of opening. The higher leak rates 
of drawer seals on canisters flown at or near the leading edge, in 
comparison to that of the M0006 canister flown on the trailing edge, are 
suggestive of the differences between AO exposure levels and 
corresponding damage to the seals. This effect will be investigated during 
testing of EECC hardware. 
Typical drawer opening time was around 17 minutes. Motor currents 
oscillated between the limits shown during each revolution of the drive 
screw. The longer time to open the MOOOS canister and higher than typical 
current draw are consistent with noise indications of higher torque loading 
of the motor noted during opening. Damage to the drive screw or its 
lubrication are possible causes to account for the degraded performance. 
The low motor current of the 80010 canister corresponded with 
observations of smooth and steady drawer opening. The S0010 canister 
was the prototype SIN 001 EECC. Its good performance is likely the result 
of "breaking in" of the mechanism during extensive operation during 
development testing. 
Follow-on work on the EECC's will include investigation of the causes of 
the observed performance differences and relate them to the differences in 
space exposure conditions where applicable. 
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EECC Performance Data 
Days EECC 
Motor opened after 
LDEF Initial Pressure Leak Rate Opening Time Run Current LDEF at 
Exp. No. Location TORR TORR/Day Minutes mA 1Atm 
MOOOS C3 <1 atm 2.7 19.5 130-230 SO 
(Air Force) (Trailing) 
50010 89 S42 12.3 16.9 110-120 100 
(LaRC/SLEMP) (Leading) 
51002 E3 1 atm 129 
(West German) (Trailing) 
MOO03 08 1 atm 12.6 17.0 150-180 140 
(Aerospace) (Off- Leading) 
SIN 004 
MOO03 04 282 15.4 150-190 150 
(Aerospace) (Off-Trailing) 
SIN 005 
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EECCSTATUS 
• Have received 81002 (West German) canister at Boeing 
.. LaRC 80010 canister to be shipped to Boeing 
• Future activities to investigate space environments on 
seals, lubricants and mechanisms 
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Metallurgical Analysis 
Except for the titanium intercostal clips, all metals examined for 
microstructure changes were mounted on exterior surfaces of LDEF and, 
therefore, saw direct exposure to atomic oxygen and/or UV radiation. 
The tray clamps were fabricated from the same aluminum alloy and 
temper used for the primary structure (6061-T6). Because of the 
availability and the variety of exposure seen by the various clamps, no 
structural members of LDEF were removed for evaluation. 
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tallurgical Analysis 
.. OBJECTIVE 
• Determine if space exposure causes 
microstructural and/or mechanical 
property changes of metals flown on lDEF 
• METALS TO BE EXAMINED 
4& SOS1-TS aluminum tray clamps 
• Representative of LDEF primary structure 
• Ti-SAI-4V intercostal clips 
• Stainless steel tray clamp bolts 
• Copper grounding straps 
100 
Metallurgical Analysis 
The results of metallurgical analysis on aluminum, stainless steel and 
titanium components flown on lDEF has shown no microstructural 
changes caused by long term space exposure. The analysis of the copper 
straps used to ground the A0178 AgfTeflon thermal control blankets is 
currently underway. 
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Metallurgical Analysis 
(Continued) 
• RESULTS TO DATE 
• Dye penetrant and eddy current inspecti.on of 
primary structure at KSC indicated nominal 
condition 
• Metallographic sectioning reveals no 
microstructural changes in near-trailing and 
-leading edge aluminum tray clamps 
• Optical examination indicates no effects on Ti 
intercostal clips 
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6061-T6 Aluminum Tray Clamp Cross-sections 
Comparison of microstructures at exposed or protected (by shim) surfaces 
of the 6061-T6 aluminum tray clamps from near the leading edge (LEFT), 
and the trailing edge (RIGHT) illustrate that space exposure has no 
discernible effect on the bulk microstructures of typical structural metals. 
The microstructures are nominal. Mechanical property changes are 
unlikely in the absence of microstructural changes. However, surface 
analysis (including scanning electron microscopy) investigations of the 
anodized surfaces of the clamps, presented in the Thermal section 
showed some smoothing or erosion effects on exposed areas near the 
leading edge. 
The microphotographs are cross-sections from two tray clamps. After 
standard metallographic preparation the specimens were etched to permit 
examination of microstructure undisturbed by the cross-sectioning 
procedure. 
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Mechanical Fastener Investigation 
Observations of high removal torque values and extensive thread seizure 
or stripping problems were widespread for all of the various stainless steel 
fasteners flown on LDEF. The potential for cold-welding of fastener faying 
(mating) surfaces during long term space exposure is of particular concern 
in the design of removable or replaceable structures for spacecraft. 
Coldwelding can occur between atomically clean metal surfaces when 
carefully prepared in vacuum. However, from a design standpoint, we 
need to determine whether cold-welding will occur under on-orbit 
environments. 
Visual examination of a large number of stainless steel bolts indicated that 
the problems were most likely related to installation damage. 
Metallographic sectioning of seized bolts confirmed this explanation. As 
an example, the facing figure shows that in the case of one tray fastener, 
seizure and subsequent shearing was caused by galling damage induced 
during original installation. The galling damage was clearly visible on the 
exposed portions of the bolt threads. This galling is more pronouned than 
what would be caused by being cycled through the self locking feature 
contained within the nut plate. The original galling damage caused bolt 
thread chips and nut-plate fragments to be generated when removal was 
attempted. The chips then caused jamming of the threads. No evidence 
exists of cold-welding between the bolt and nut thread surfaces. 
We have received three fastener assemblies from PI hardware possessing 
sheared bolts caused by attempted removal. Using the procedure 
described in the above paragraph, it has been determined that all three 
failures were the result of galling caused by pre-flight assembly and/or 
post-flight removal. 
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DEFINITIONS 
The definitions on the following page were developed to define 
the three different causes of metallic wear and adhesion 
discussed within this report; cold welding, galling, and fretting. 
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DEFINITIONS 
COLD-WELDING (Micro-welding): Solid state metallic bonding between atoms on opposing surface layers of similar or 
dissimilar metals. Contamination free surfaces are required for bonding to occur. The presence of lubricants such as 
naturally occurring oxides, contaminants contained within the atmosphere or organic films will effectively prevent 
adhesion. These contaminants (lubricants) can be removed, pre-flight or on-orbit, by fastener installation or during 
sliding contact. If the surface contaminants are removed on-orbit, they will reform very slowly, if at all, in the vacuum of 
space. Cold-welding is also dependent on compressive stresses between mating surfaces, temperature, abrasion, and 
time. In extreme cases, contamination films on metal surfaces can be penetrated under high contact stresses, resulting 
in cold welding of asperity contacts (Ref. 5). The susceptabiilty to cold-welding between dissimilar metals is enhanced 
by like crystal structures and similar atom sizes. 
GALLING: Wear condition whereby excessive friction between high spots (asperities) results in localized welding with 
subsequent spalling. metal tearout or metal transfer and further roughening of the rubbing surfaces of one or two 
mating parts. 
FRETTING: Type of wear that occurs between tight-fitting surfaces subjected to cyclic relative motions of extremely 
small amplitude such as caused by vibration. Fine wear debris powders are generated. 
NOTES: 1) The symptoms/results of seizure are the same independent of whether they were caused by galling or cold 
welding. In both cases, photo-micrographs of a cross section of the seized joint would show solid state metallic 
bonding between mating surfaces. The difference is that cold-welding is caused by contamination free surfaces 
coupled with compressive stresses leading to metal adhesion where as galling is caused by excessive friction {due to 
poor tolerances, insufficient or improper lubrication, improper material selection, etc.} between asperities resulting in 
metal adhesion. Frictional heating during galling will enhance the metallic adhesion. 
2) Cold welding can occur between atomically clean metal surfaces when carefully prepared in a vacuum chamber on 
earth (Ref. 6). The question is whether cold welding will occur in on-orbit service conditions. While we have not found 
any evidence of cold-welding occurring on LDEF, it is important to remember that, 1) none of the experiments or 
hardware flown on LDEF were designed to have cold-welding take place, 2) our investigation is ongoing, and 3) there 
have been several on-orbit failures on earlier spacecraft in which cold-welding is a suspected cause of failure (Ref. 7). 
Reference 5: Metals Handbook, 9th Edition, pg. 154. 
Reference 6: Hammel, R. L, -Propulsion Component Coldwelding Experiments Performed with an Earth Orbiting 
Satellite-, TRW, 1969 
Reference 7: Monroe, R. E., -Adhesion in the Space Environment-, Battelle Institute, October 1966. 
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Unassembled Intercostal Fastener 
An unassembled, undisturbed, and as-flown titanium intercostal fastener 
(LEFT) was cross-sectioned (RIGHT) to investigate the possibility of 
cold-welding without the complications of removal effects. The thread 
faying surfaces and bolt shank/aluminum plate interfaces were examined 
for indications of cold- (or micro-) welding. Close-ups of the areas of 
interest are shown in the following figures. 
This fastener assembly was cross-sectioned because of its availability, not 
because we had evidence that cold welding had occurred. 
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Intercostal Fastener Cross-section 
Examination of the bolt shank interfaces (opposite page) reveals no 
evidence of cold-welding. The thread faying surfaces (following page) also 
show no evidence of cold-welding; however, minor galling and some 
smearing of the silver-plating (specified for lubrication) on the stainless 
steel nut is evident. 
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LDEF TRAY CLAMP FASTENERS 
The tray clafTlp mounting bolts are 140,000 psi ultimate strength rated 
A286 corrosion resistant steel hex head parts with no finish. They were 
installed with alodined aluminum washers under the head and into self-locking 
helicoil inserts. The pre-flight installation torque was 75 in-Ibs, plus or minus 5 
in-Ibs. 
During deintegration of LDEF, all tray clamp fastener breakway torques (unseating 
torques) were determined using a dial gauge torque wrench. In addition, running 
(prevailing) torques were determined for every third tray clamp bolt. 
A database was created that contained all breakaway and running torques. The 
torques were then examined as a function of their location on LDEF. As can be 
seen on the following chart, the average breakaway torque values are similar 
throughout LDEF. This showed that there was no pronounced effect on fastener 
removal parameters by the various space environments. However, there was a 
large scatter in values. The database identified the bolts that were within the 
twenty highest and twenty lowest values. These bolts then underwent visual 
examination in an attempt to identify the causes of their high or low breakaway 
torques. 
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LDEFTRAYCLAMPFASTENERS 
• 2,232 Tray Clamp Bolts 
• 1/4" - 20 x 0.75" 
• Self-locking helicoils on primary structure 
• Pre-flight torque was 75 in-lbs 
• 140,000 psi ultimate tensile strength, A286 stainless steel 
• Bolts alcohol cleaned, patted dry prior to installation 
• 2,172 breakaway (unseating) torques in database 
Results are as follows: 
• Space end, average of 252 bolts = 74 in-Ibs 
• Earth end, average of 216 bolts = 73 in-Ibs 
• Circumference, average of 1691 bolts = 71 in-Ibs 
• Leading edge, average of 120 bolts = 78 in-Ibs 
• Trailing edge, average of 144 bolts = 72 in-Ibs 
• Average of twenty lowest values = 31 in-Ibs 
• Average of twenty highest values = 175 in-Ibs 
• Range of values, 205 in-Ibs to 10 in-Ibs 
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LDEF TRAY CLAMP FASTENERS (cont'd) 
No correlation was foun9 between the bolts that possessed high running 
torques and high breakaway torques. There was only one bolt that possessed 
both one of the twenty highest running and twenty highest breakway torques. 
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LDEF TRAY CLAMP FASTENERS 
4) 716 Running (prevailing) torques in database. Results are as 
follows: 
e Average running torque = 17 in-Ibs 
.. Average of twenty highest = 58 in-Ibs 
., Range of values, 132 in-Ibs to 2 in-Ibs 
.. No correlation between high runnng and high breakaway 
torques 
.. Need to determine cause of high and low values 
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lDEF BOlTIWASHER DAMAGE RATING CODES 
This chart shows the code that was developed to assist in the "visual inspection of the 
fasteners. To date 54 bolts have been examined using this code. In addition to the 
bolts possessing extreme removal parameters, several "average" bolts have been 
examined for comparison purposes. 
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LDEFBo/: asher Damage Rating Codes 
• Bolts 
81 ::: No galUng, very little thread scoring 
82 ::: light galling/thread wear, no deposits, 
thread crests may be sharpened or rounded 
B3 ::: Medium galling, threads may be sharpened, 
or rounded, few deposits and smears, few areas 
of metal removal 
B4 ::: Heavy galling, threads sharpened or rounded,several 
deposits, smears, or areas of metal removal, slivers 
85 = Threads mostly removed, much smearing, deposits, 
metal removal 
• Washers 
W1 = Very little smearing or scoring 
W2 = Moderate smearing or scoring 
W3 = Heavy smearing or scoring 
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LDEF Tray Clamp Fastener Conclusions 
Visual examination of several of these bolts and washers has revealed a variety of bolt thread conditions 
from threads that appear to be almost unused (only a very fine burnish-like line on the flank or flat of 
some threads) to such severe galling as to entirely remove several threads. Many bolts have what 
appears to be aluminum deposits on the unthreaded or grip part of the shank between the threads and the 
bolt head, as if there was a hole misalignment between the clamp and the structure. 
Visual examination of the mating washers also revealed varying degrees of scoring. burnishing and galling 
on both sides due to relative motion between bolt thread condition, possible hole misalignment, or washer 
condition, with the bolt torque values recorded during removal of the tray clamps that could lead to any 
decision regarding the occurrance of cold welding. 
Future activities include: 1) continued visual examination of bolts and washers and 2) cycle new unused 
bolts in new helicoils to develop baseline data. 
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LDEF Tray Clamp Fasteners Conclusions 
• Database created, subjective rating code established 
• To date, 54 bolts/washers visually examined at ax minimum 
ED Visual examination reveals a variety of bolt thread conditions 
ranging from appearance of unused to complete removal of 
threads 
• Many bolts show signs of misalignment between bolt hole in 
tray clamp and bolt hole in the structure . 
III Visual examination· of mating washers reveal variety of scoring, 
burnishing, and galling 
III To date, no significant correlation has been found between thread 
condition, washer condition, and removal torques 
III No evidence of cold welding has been found 
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lDEF PRIMARY STRUCTURE RE-TORQUING 
.. All fastener assemblies re-torqued to pre-flight values per procedure LDEF-SED-014. 
Values lower than pre-flight were documented 
.. Bolt diameters ranged from 1/4" to 7/S". Silver plated nuts 
.. 2928 fastener assemblies re-torqued 
4& Only 40/0 of the assemblies had "relaxed" 
.. Nut rotations, to achieve pre-flight values, ranged from 5 to 120 degrees 
.. Mapping of relaxed assemblies in progress 
.. Breaking torques of selected relaxed and non-relaxed bolts determined 
4& Intact intercoastal fastener assembly cross-sectioned 
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PI Test Results 
The French flew an experiment titled "Microwelding of Various Metalling 
Materials". The materials that were tested included AI alloys, Cu alloys, Ti 
alloys and stainless steel. Selected combinations of materials were 
chromic or sulfuric anodized. Other combinations used MoS2 and 
Molykote Z lubricants. The specimens were loaded together by the use of 
disc springs. All hardware has been removed and no microwelding has 
been found. Most of the material combinations are representative of 
sliding electric contacts or mechanisms used to deploy solar panels. 
These material combinations were selected so that microwelding did not 
occur. The results, to date, verify the selections. 
Extensive seizure difficulties encountered during stainless steel fastener 
removal of LDEF experiment A0175 are of interest because of the use of 
cetyl alcohol as a lubricant during installation. The alcohol would have 
subsequently evaporated possibly leaving contamination-free (though not 
necessarily oxide-free) fastener faying surfaces that may have been 
susceptible to cold-welding. Unassembled, undisturbed fastener 
assemblies are currently awaiting metal/ographic cross-sectioning and 
examination at Boeing. 
The System SIG investigation has found no evidence, as yet, of 
cold-welding between metals flown on LDEF. The presence of normal 
surface oxides, lubricants or contaminants on normally processed metallic 
materials would likely preclude the occurrence of cold-welding during 
subsequent space exposure. 
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PI Test Results 
" A0138 .. 10", Microwelding of Various -Metanic Materials 
• Testing materials under load 
e AI alloy, Cu alloy, TI alloy, stainless steel 
" Selected components chromic or sulfuric anodized 
" MoS2 and Molykote Z used on selected components 
• To date, no microwelding found 
" A0175 - Evaluation of Composites in Space 
• Extensive seizing problems during fastener removel 
• Used cetyl alcohol as pre-flight lubricant 
• The cetyl alcohol has probably "evaporated" leaving 
clean metal to metal interfaces 
• Untouched fastener asemblies to be evaluated for 
galling/cold welding 
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End Support Beam 
The end support beam (ESB) was an 18 ft long aluminum frame that held 
the two end trunnions. It was designed to have a plus or minus 1.5 degree 
rotation about a 5" diameter stainless steel spindle to accommodate 
potential misalingement of the LDEF structure and still permit berthing in 
the shuttle cargo bay. A great deal of difficulty was encountered during 
removal of the ESB from its spindle (required for deintegration). 
121 
.: 
nd Support Beam 
It + 1 1/2 degree rotation about spindle to 
accomodate potential misalignment of lDEF 
structure and allow berthing in shuttle cargo bay 
• Spindle: 17-4 PH stainless steel 
• ESS: Welded SOS1-TS AI Truss 
• Removal of ESe necessary for de-integration 
• Difficulty encountered in removal 
CD No problems noted pre-flight 
• Analysis to determine cause of removal difficulty 
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End Support Beam 
, During post-flight removal, no difficulties were encountered during the 
initial axial displacement of the ESB from the spindle. However, after 
approximately one inch of axial displacement had been accomplished, a 
great deal of difficulty was encountered. 
, Review of the video documenting the removal of the ESB strongly 
indicated these difficulties and the resulting galling damage to the 
aluminum ESB bore were caused by alignment difficulties. The hoist 
installed to support the beam apparently caused it to cock and jam on the 
spindle as the beam was pulled off of the first spindle land. Uncontrolled 
and excessive rotation of the jammed ESB about the spindle'in an attempt 
to further move it caused extensive galling damage on the inner bore of 
the ESB as seen in the following photograph. 
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H01()'22·9C).lBS 
Location of 
132 
End support beam 
Spindle 
End support beam \ 
Inner 
land 
Position of End Support Beam When It Became Stuck 
on Spindle During Removal Attempt 
End Support Beam 
Severe galling and scoring is apparent in the bore of the ESB. The two 
circumferential score marks nearest the front face of the ESB correspond 
to the position and width of outer land of the spindle when the beam 
jammed after coming off the inner spindle land. Uncontrolled rotation of 
the ESB about the spindle during further removal attempts caused galling 
between the stainless steel spindle and aluminum ESB which resulted in 
scoring of the softer aluminum. The axial scoring in the bore was caused 
when a gear-puller was finally employed to remove the beam. 
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ESB Spindle 
The lower right hand photograph shows galling damage/aluminum 
adhesion on the outer land of the stainless steel spindle. Aluminum was 
transferred to the edges of the land during rotation of the ESB. 
Subsequent gear-puller removal caused the axial streaks. Evidence of 
minor fretting damage was observed on the portion of the spindle inserted 
into the LDEF structure as indicated in the center photograph. Small 
relative motions between the LDEF structure and the spindle caused 
during transport and flight are the probable source of the fretting. 
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ESB Spindle 
To confirm that the galling of the ESB bore and aluminum metal transfer to 
the outer spindle land was caused by removal damage and not 
cold-welding during flight, metallographic cross-sections were prepared. 
Shear deformations of the microstructure of aluminum stuck to the spindle 
land are consistent with removal motions. No evidence of cold-welding 
between the aluminum and the stainless steel spindle was observed. 
The photograph on the right is a cross-section of the area shown on the 
left. As can be seen, there is no metal diffusion between the aluminum 
and stainless steel. The discrete interface between the aluminum and SS 
indicates that cold-welding did not occur. 
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Grapple Fixtures 
Both the rigidize sensing (active) and the flight standard (passive) grapple 
fixtures are undergoing post-flight evaluation to determine the effects of 
long term exposure to the LEO environment. This will provide critical 
information on the on-orbit performance of the grapple fixtures. 
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Grapple Fixtures 
• Two grapple fixtures 
• Rigidize sensing grapple designed to turn EIS on or off via RMS with lDEF 
stm in cargo bay. Not used during retrieval since aU experiments were 
inactive. 
• Flight standard grapple used to deploy and retrieve via the RMS on orbit 
• Both grapple fixtures were returned to JSC for post flight examination 
and evaluation 
• Tungsten disulfide lubricant lifted from each grapple shaft for evaluation 
• CAM buffers removed for evaluation by materials and micrometeoroid study 
groups 
• Outer abutment plate removed for micrometeoroid evaluation 
• CAM action microswitches removed and sent to the manufacturer for testing 
• Trays removed for micrometeoroid and debris evaluation. Tray bolts and 
fasteners being evaluated by the McDonnell Douglas space systems Co. 
• Paint samples taken from each grapple fixture for evaluation 
• Grapple fixtures shipped to Spar Aerospace (original equipment 
manufacturer) 
• Functional testing of the rigidize senSing grapple fixture to be performed 
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Magnetically Anchored Viscous Damper 
The viscous damper was used to provide attitude stabilization. The 
attitude of LDEF proved to be so stable that astronaut Brandenstein was 
able to fly the shuttle within the distance that allowed Bonnie Dunbar to 
merely extend the RMS to the grapple. 
On-flight performance and post-flight test results prove the long term use 
of the viscous dampers on the Space Station, during segment attitude 
_ control, is a viable option. 
A copy of the viscous damper test report is available upon request. 
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Magnetically Anchored Viscous Damper 
• located on the centerline, in the body of lDEF, near the space 
end, to provide attitude stabilization from spinning, tumbling 
or oscillations, caused by deployment or other externally 
applied forces 
• Post flight testing of the lDEF damper by the manufacturer, 
General Electric, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, has been 
completed 
• Test results show no anomalies 
• Damper to be returned to langley Research Center, in flight 
ready condition with 10,000 centistoke viscous fluid 
• A purchase of 16 dampers is being considered for the use on 
space station during the construction phase 
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THERMAL CONTROL SURFACES EXPERIMENT (TSCE) - 50069 
OBJECTIVE: To determine the post-flight operational condition of the TCSE flight 
hardware. Functional tests were performed and analyses conducted where necessary to 
determine the operational condition of the TCSE as a system. These functional tests 
included: 
- Power-up transient monitoring of TCSE subsystems 
- Functional test of both reflectance and daily measurements 
- Analysis comparing the post-flight condition of the TSCE with the pre-flight condition 
SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS: The post-flight functional tests showed the system to 
be in surprisingly good health. Most subsystems and components are in good enough 
shape for the system to perform both reflectance and daily measurement functions. From 
tests and analysis of flight data, there are a number of anomalies that will require detailed 
analysis. These include: 
- Failure of a relay in the flight recorder which resulted in loss of one third of the flight 
data 
- Premature latch-up of the 25th clock bit 
- Hanging of the carousel during rotation at sample 25 resulting in loss of some 
reflectance data 
- Bad or excessively noisy data in some of the UV reflectance measurements both 
in-flight and in post-flight measurements . 
A copy of the ninety page "TCSE Post Flight System Functional Check-out Final Test 
Report" is available upon request. 
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PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
Difficult fastener removals related to galling during pre-flight installation and/or post-
flight removal. 
• Stainless steels are very susceptible to galling 
• Successful application requires high thread quality and appropriate lubrication 
schemes 
No evidence of cold-welding 
End support beam removal difficulties caused by misalignment during removal 
No metallurgical changes in aluminum or titanium 
Dye penetrant and eddy current inspection of primary structure indicated nominal 
condition 
All five EECC's opened successfully 
• Cannister pressures and leak rates determined 
The viscous damper and grapple post-flight test results are nominal 
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Follow-On Activities 
• EECC's 
4& Coordination of test plans with Aerospace 
Corp. and Wright-Patterson efforts 
• Analysis of component motors, gears, drive 
screws, lubrication, seals, bearings, springs, etc. 
• Tray Clamp Fasteners 
• Continue visual examination of bolts and washers 
• Cycle new, unused bolts in new helicoils to 
develop baseline data 
• Sectioning of as-assembled flight and control 
joints 
• Evaluation and analysis of additional experimental 
hardware and mechanisms such as: 
• A0187-1 micrometroid clamshells 
• Mechanisms, seals and lubricants 
• Monitor PI testing of hardware 
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OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the System SIG Optics discipline is to develop a 
handbook and/or· database that identifies hardware flown and results from 
testing of that hardware. 
Unlike the Electrical and Mechanical discipline areas, the System SIG 
Optics effort relies primarily on the testing of hardware at the various 
experimenter's laboratories. This is because all optics hardware is part of 
individual experiments. Currently, we anticipate minimal testing of Optics 
hardware at Boeing. . 
A test matrix will be developed that contains hardware flown, the PI test 
plane, and tests desired by the Systems SIG. 
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Ibjectives 
o Optimize 'systems' investigations 
• Data provides useful information 
e Valid measure of effects of space 
exposure 
• PI hardware is major source of 
information 
o Develop test matrix of hardware flown, 
PI test plans, and tests desired by SSIG 
• Coordination of testing with Pis is 
critical 
• Further testing by SSIG identified 
laboratories 
• Handbook/database w/results of systems 
investigations 
• Results influence future design and use 
of space systems 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST 
Optical hardware of interest falls into several categories. The following 
foils give the specific hardware breakdown within each category. 
Glasses and filters are the first two types of hardware. Design ranges for 
these cover the ultraviolet through mid infrared ranges of the spectrum. 
Numerous UV and IR windows, bandpass filters, hot (heat reflecting) 
mirrors and optical attenuators were selected for the LDEF mission. 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTERES'l' 
GlasRes [UV-VI8-IR] 
Alumlnosilicate, hornSllicate, lead silicate, potash 
boroSIlIcate, Si02, soda lime silIca, soda potash lIme, tItanlum 
~llicate, 12-UV transmissive WIndows [includes controls, MgF2, 
Sapphire (A1203), CaF2, LiF, 8i02], black glass [low scatter), CaF2, 
CdTe, Ge, ~i02, 81, KRS-5, KRS-6, ZnSe, BaF2, MgF2, Al203, Corning 
7940, S11prasil W, Ge (polycrystaline, high purIty) 
Fil ters [lTV-VIS-IR] 
CriSe, Ge, PbTe, PbF2, KRS-5, SiO, ZnSe, ZnS, CryolIte on S102, 
PbF2 on 8102, MgF2 on 8i02, 8iO on 8102, Ag on 8i02, ThF2 on 8i02, ZnS 
on Sl02, AR coating on MgF2, assorted optical bandpass between 0.3 
anri 1.1 mIcron~ [Schott glasse~], Alan 8102, np.lltri'\l densIty 
[manufacturer: Corion), narrow hand [Carlon), hot mirrors (Carlon, 
'.'Isible tranRInlttlng], Lyman alph21 anri 1600 angstrom LTV fllters, A120'3 
011 ~1()2, fv1WJn p si 11m dl f] onrlCle on S102, aR~orted fi 1 tel'S [mfr: OCL I] , 
SlO on 8102, SiF12 on 8i02, Ge on SJ02, Ag on 8102 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (cont'd) 
Paints and thermal control coatings make up the next category. Also· 
included in this list are paints and other surface preparations used directly 
on the LDEF structure. 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (contd) 
Palnts/thermal control coatings 
Chemglaze A-276 on AI, Zinc oXIde-silicate [Z-93] on AI, 
Cnem~laze Z-306 on AI, Chemglaze [hlack] on graphite epoxy [GrIEp], 
Zlnc oxide-silicone [S-13GLO] on AI, S-13GLO on GriEp, Zinc 
orthotltlnate-sllicate [YB-71] on AI, Chemglaze 9924 primer, Chemglaze 
Z-302 on AI, Ben Har acrylic, 3M 401 C10 [black], 25 other surfaces in 
an active experiment, D-l11 [black], Ag backed Teflon, Zinc 
orthotitlnate (ZN2 Ti04, IITRI (white)], DC92-007 [white], PV100 ML101 
[white], Sperex AP-I0l [white], Sperex AP-I02 [black], Ti02 Me Si 
MLI01 [white], alpha Al203 Me Si MLIOl [white], EU~03 Me 51 MLI01 
[whIte], JB-l on Ta [black], NS43G #MM/GSFC [white], Catalac flat. 
hlack paInt, PVI00 with silicone-alkyd binder [white], Chemglaze II A 
'171 (red], S2 [ASTRAI,/CNES (black)}, P 123 [ASTRAL, primer], PSG 120 
FD )';11i('onp pcunt [CNES-ASTRAL (white)}, PSZ 184 SJllcate pflint 
[~STR.AL], ~lnc chromate primer, MS-74 [\l/hi.te], Polymer fllms [Kapton, 
Kynar PVF2] 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (cont'd) 
Metal films (in most cases laid down on quartz substrates) and surfaces of 
metal solids (including assorted aluminum and stainless steel alloys) make 
up this category of LDEF hardware. Many of these materials are made 
available from the LDEF structure. 
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OPTICAL HARmlARE OF INTEFE8T (C'ontri) 
Metal films [substrates specified if known] 
IndIum oxide [ln203], Aluminum oxjde, Au plated Al [2024-T351], 
A~ plated Al [6003], Au on Si02, Ir on Si02, Nb on Si02, Os on 8j02, 
Pt on Si02, cu on Si02, Ag on C, Ag on Si02, Ta on 8i02, W on 8102, Sn 
on 8i02, Zn on Si02, OSR mirrors [Au, AI, Ag] 
Met~l surfaces [self-supporting: includes m1rror and diffuse surfaces] 
Chromic acid anodized Al [low, med and high emmissivity], 
sulfuric acid anodized AI, Ni plating [on ?], LDEF structure [numerous 
possibles], stainless steel [asst: 303, 307, 327, 500), aluminum 
alloy [asst: 2014-T6511, 5056-H39, 2024-xx, 6063-T52, 6061-T651, 7075-
T6], alorlyne on AI, Mo mirror [~oated and 11ncoated), djamond turned Cu 
mirror 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (cont'd) 
Optical sources range from a flashlamp to a C02 laser and nearly 
everything between. Detectors fall into several categories, including 
photovoltaic, photoconductive and pyroelectric types with several 
examples of each. 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (contd) 
Optical sources 
C02 waveguide laser, Nd+:YAG laser [glass rod], HeNe laser, laser 
diodes [AIGaAs and an array], flash lamp, 3-GaAs LEDs [830nm nominal], 
one sealed emitter module (1300nm], pre- and non-irradiated LEDs 
[probably 830nm, GaAs] 
Optical detectors 
Si and IJV-enhanced Si [PIN], PMT [UV response], pyroelectrics 
[lithium tantalate (LiTa03), strontium barium niobate (SBN), 
triglycine sulfate (TGS)J, numerous photovoltaics lSi, PbSnTe arrays, 
GaAsSb, HgCdTe, InSb], various photoconductors [HgCdTe, PbS, PbSe], 
solar cells (including CuINSe2 and other thin film types], numerous 
solar cells [Si based] were flown in the Advanced Photovoltaic 
Experiment, GaAs and GaAIAs/GaAs solar cells, at least one channeltron 
array [original (trademarked) name for a micro-channel plate (MCP»), 
pre-.and non-irradiated photodiodes 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (cont'd) 
Optical fibers of various types (e.g. step and graded index) were flown on 
LDEF. Most, if not all, of these were multimode and therefore low 
bandwidth or short haul types 
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OPTICAL HARDWARE OF INTEREST (contd) 
Fiber optics 
Numerous fibers [nominally 10, silica core, unknown core 
diameter; reportedly, both step and graded index types] with various 
cladding materials from the Fiber Optic Data Transmission Experiment, 
one fiber of unknown type/composition from the Space Environmental 
Effects experiment, 4 multimode silica core fibers and 4 fibers of 
unknown material/modality [but probably silica core, -multimode] from 
the Space Environment Effects on Fiber Optics Systems experiment 
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SELECTION CRITERIA/RATIONALE 
This chart briefly describes some of the areas of interest for the different 
categories of optic hardware 
From a system point of view, degradation of thermal control surfaces and 
painted baffles leads to both reduced baffling efficiency and deposition of 
particulates onto optical elements. Degradation of an optical surface due 
to exposure, combined with particulate deposition causes a loss of light 
transmission (or reflection, if a reflecting optic) and a loss of image quality 
(e.g. a sensor system). 
When fiber optics are exposed to radiation (gamma and gamma-dot) they 
tend to become darker ( less transmissive). Since signal level of a system 
is determined through a set of tradeoffs, this darkening can either reduce 
the available bandwidth (frequenq response) or increase the number of 
errors generated, or both. Degration of semiconductor sources and 
receivers due to radiation will compound these system related problems. 
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SELECT/i CRITERIA/RAT/I 
Degradation of transparent elements (darkening, contamination) 
• Diffuse scatter increase reduces throughput of light for 
imaging systems 
• Degrades image" resolution 
Degradation of diffuse paints or metals (erosion, discoloration) 
• Baffling efficiency decreased due to increase in specular 
reflection 
• Redeposition on other materials 
• Contamination of systems optics 
Fiber optic darkening 
• Loss of signal 
• Increase in system BER 
• Reduced bandwidths 
Semiconductor detector changes 
• Responsivity 
• Detectivity 
• Rise time (system bandwidth) 
164 
STATUS/FUTURE ACTIVITIES 
Detailed lists of lDEF optics hardware have been obtained and are being 
consolidated in a database. The database is a/so being filled with 
information pertaining to PI test plans and tests which the SSIG desires, 
which will allow us to generate a testing matrix. A review of IDA's 
document of lDEF importance to SDI has been made and reviews of 
preliminary PI test results are continuing. Discussions with Pis are in 
progress to determine as much as possible about their test plans (e.g. - do 
they have controls, what tests are planned, is destructive testing planned, 
how will their data be formatted, what test they will definitely not perform 
due to insufficient funds or facilities, will test documents be available to the 
SSIG). 
165 
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s TUS 
It Detailed list of Optics hardware flown on LDEF completed 
It Ongoing discussions with PI's regarding their test plans 
• Initiated matrix of PI's test plans vs System SIG desired 
testing 
• Review of preliminary PI test results 
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Preliminary Findings, Thermal 
The foJlowing chart summarizes preliminary findings within the 
Thermal discipline. The majority of the Thermal section describes the 
status in determining durability of silverized teflon and chromic acid 
anodize coatings. These evaluations were performed at Boeing with 
funding provided by the Materials SIG. 
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Preliminarv Findings, Thermal 
• On orbit contamination changed optical properties of thermal control 
coatings from their pre-flight values. UV and/or atomic oxygen (AO) 
exposure further contributed to the~e changes .. 
• White thermal control paints exposed to UV darkened due to changes 
in the paint binder .. This resulted in dramatic increases in ale. The 
same white paints exposed to AO and UV remained white since the AO 
removed the binder .. These specimens generally became more diffuse .. 
• AO induced erosion of thermal control coatings occurred at Incident 
angles up to 100 degrees. 
e Preliminary analysis has shown that space end exposure (maximum UV 
exposure) resulted in a slight decrease in the chromic acid anodizing 
thickness. 
• The long term exposure of CAA aluminum to the lEO environment 
caused a slight increase in the a/e. Future activities will determine if 
these changes were a result of contamination or an actual change in the 
CAA. 
• Solar absorptance and thermal emittance of the silverized Teflon 
blanket's were unchanged from pre-flight values. Specularity 
decreased for blankets exposed to AO. Leading edge recession rates 
of the Teflon was 15-20 microns. 
• Surface temperatures were within pre-flight design goals. lDEF interior 
saw benign temperatures throughout flight. 
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Chromic Acid Anodized Aluminum 
Thermal Control Coatings 
LDEF offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the performance of the chromic acid 
anodized aluminum after prolonged space exposure. The constant orientation of 
LDEF relative to the RAM direction throughout its entire mission has resulted in a 
unique distribution of exposure conditions. Since the tray clamps were positioned 
uniformily around the satellite, they represent every possible environmental 
exposure condition to both atomic oxygen and ultraviolet flux. They should, 
therefore, provide a complete picture of the combined space effects on the 
performance and durability of the chromic acid anodized coating. With this in 
mind, the objective of these analyses was to characterize the performance of the 
anodize coating as a function of space environmental exposure. 
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Boeing Aerospace" Electronics 
Space Environ ental Effects on the Integrity of 
Chromic Acid Anodized Coatings 
Objective: 
Characterize performance of the anodize 
coating as a function of space environmental 
exposure 
Tests to Date: 
• Specular and diffuse reflectance 
• Surface analysis 
• SEM and metallography 
• Absorptance and emittance 
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The tray clamps were anodized prior to flight to achieve an ale ratio of 2.1 ± 0.2. 
The stability of this ratio is measurement of the durability of the coating and an 
indication of its effectiveness i n thermally protecting the spacecraft. Since the effects 
of long term space exposure on the survivability of the anodize coating is an 
important parameter to be considered by designers of future low earth orbit 
spacecraft, considerable effort has been expended to analyze the absorptance and 
emittance of as many clamps as possible. To date ninety-eight clamps have been 
evaluated. There was not, however, a suitable population of non-flight control 
specimens. Only one non-flight control has been tested for comparison. Three other 
ground control clamps are available and will be tested. Fortunately, the reverse side 
of each clamp did not see the effects of space exposure. This afforded us a built in 
control for each clamp. The fact that the ale values for the exposed and non exposed 
sides of each clamp could be compared allowed us to conduct a meaningful paired "t" 
analysis on the data to determine the statistical significance of the results. 
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Data points have been collected which represent all of the possible exposures to 
which LDEF was subjected. As seen in Table II, one of the main thrusts thus far has 
been comparison between the earth and space end exposures with over 1/3 of the 
samples analyzed coming from these two areas. The data indicates that there was a 
considerable difference in the percent change in the ale ratio between the two 
populations with the space end increasing by 6.1 % while the earth end samples 
increased by only 1 .50/0. This indicates that UV exposure may have an adverse effect 
on the integrity of the anodize layer. 
All of the average ratios from both the exposed and reverse sides of the clamps still 
fell within the range initially specified prior to flight and that the total average change 
thus far was only 4.8% for all samples tested. The differences noted however are 
real and are statistically significant at the 990/0 confidence level. All available tray 
clamps should be made available for absorptance and emittance testing to provide 
the largest possible data base to ascertain the relationship between the magnitude of 
these changes and the position on LDEF. Tests will also be initiated to determine if 
the observed result are related to space exposure or contamination effects. 
While the differences observed thus far are relatively small it is unknown what effect 
longer exposures will have on the changes in optical properties. Assuming that the 
observed changes were induced by space exposure, they could have already 
reached their maximum levels and will now be constant with time or they could be 
following an Arrhenius relationship and may increase with further exposure. This 
points out the need for future ground based simulation to attempt to duplicate these 
results and determine the effects of longer exposure on the performance of the 
coating. 
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Position n 
Earth 20 
Space 19 
Off-Trailing Top 5 
Off-Trailing Keel 11 
Trailing 12 
Perpendicular 5 
Off-Leading Top 12 
Off-Leading Keel 8 
Leading 6 
Avg 
a I e For non flight 
Control = 1.97 
Boeing Aerospace II Electronics 
Ave ale A~ Front Back 
2.07 2.04 1.5 
2.26 2.13 6.1 
2.26 2.13 6.1 
2.24 2.09 7.2 
2.29 2.11 8.5 
2.26 2.21 2.3 
2.17 2.09 3.8 
2.23 2.06 8.3 
2.18 2.15 1.4 
2.20 2.10 4.8 
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The metallurgical analysis has thus far been focused on the tray clamps 
associated with the copper grounding straps. These clamps offered the unique 
opportunity to evaluate areas on the same side of the clamp which were either 
fully exposed to the environment or protected by the grounding strap of the 
shims. 
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Figure 5 contains photographs of the clamp from tray E-02-6. The areas on the 
clamp which were protected by the shim and the ground strap can be easily 
detected as lighter regions on the clamp surface. Obviously, contamination from 
external sources has contributed some of the discoloration on the exposed area. 
The role of UV and atomic oxygen exposure in this discoloration is being 
investigated. 
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FIGURE 5. Photo macrographs of tray clamp E02-6 with arrows indicating 
boundaries between exposed regions and those protected by (A) the 
copper ground strap and (8) the aluminum shim. 
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Figure 6 contains photomicrographs of cross sections obtained from exposed and 
protected areas of tray clamps subjected to leading edge exposure (Figure 6 A&B 
from clamp E10-6) and trailing edge exposure (Figure 6 C&D from clamp E02-6). 
The most notable feature in these figures is what appears to be debris on the 
protected surfaces of the clamps. 
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FIGURE 6. Optical photomicrographs at 1000X depicting (A) protected and (8) 
exposed regions from the surface of leading edge clamp E10-6 and 
from (e) protected and (D) exposed areas from trailing edge clamp 
£02-6. 132 
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SEM Photomicrographs revealed that what appeared to be isolated pieces of 
debris was actually a discrete layer on the surface of the clamp. 
183 
( )( 
i 
-eeel 3e.eKU XI/See le~m 
:. 
." 
" 
' ... ~: ..  ....... ~ 
i • 
-eee2 3e.eKW X141eee l~m 
_ i 
FIGURE 7. Higher magnification scanning electron photomicrographs depicting 
the observed surface layer on the protected surfaces of tray clamp 
ElO-6. 
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An EDX spectrum obtained from the layer of debris is presented in Figure 8. The 
data indicates that the material was comprised solely of aluminum, probably in 
the form of aluminum oxide. The exact source of this layer is not known at the 
present time. However, it is probably related to some smearing of the surface 
associated with the application of the anodize coating. Regardless of the source, 
Figure 6 indicates that is it absent from the areas of the clamp that were exposed 
to the space environment. This indicates that oxidation of the surface has 
occurred as a result of exposure. 
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FIGURE 8. EOX elemental spectrum of surface layer observed on protected 
surface of tray clamp E10-6 
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Figure 9 contains SEM photomicrographs of both exposed (Figure 9 A&C) and 
protected (Figure 9 8&D) areas from the surface of a trailing edge clamp, E-02-6. 
As seen in these figures the surface of the clamp appears to be moderately pitted 
and there is no significant variation in the amount of pitting present on the 
exposed or protected surface. 
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FIGURE 9. SEM photomicrographs depicting surface porosity on (A) exposed and 
(8) protected at IOOX and (e) exposed and (D) protected at 1000X 
for trailing edge clamp E02-6. 183 
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Figure 10 contains SEM photomicrographs of exposed (Figure 10 A&C) and 
protected (Figure 10 8&D) areas from a leading edge tray clamp, E-10-6. It 
should be noted that, while pits are also present in both the exposed and 
protected areas of the coating, the number of pits present on the exposed surface 
in this case is considerably greater than on the protected surface. Since the pits 
were observed on both the exposed and protected areas of the surface, coupled 
with the fact that their morphology was similar in both areas it has been . 
concluded that their presence was probably the result of coating degradation as 
opposed to micrometeorite damage. The data obtained during the current 
analysis indicates therefore that leading edge exposure may degrade the anodize 
coating. Further testing in this area is needed, however. More clamps need to 
be analyzed to confirm these results. The metallurgical analysis should be 
conducted in conjunction with SIMS profiling to correlate observed degradation 
with coating thickness. Image analysiS should also be employed to quantify the 
degree of pitting. 
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FIGURE 10. SEM photomicrographs depicting surface porosity on CA) exposed 
and (8) protected at 100X and (e) exposed and (D) protected at 1000X for leading edge clamp E10-6. 
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CHR Ie ACID ANODIZED ALUMINUM 
CONCLUSIONS 
• Spectroscopic anomalies on tray clamps appear to be random and 
unrelated to exposure or position on lDEF 
• Surface analysis indicated that space end exposure resulted in a 
decrease in CAA thickness 
~ • Metallurgical analysis indicated that leading edge exposure increased 
~ the porosity of the CAA 6061 aluminum 
!"fi 
2 
~ • long term space exposure results in a slight increase of ale of CAA 
~ 6061 aluminum 
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Aerospace 
Systems 
Technologies 
e Tray Clamps 
Future Activities 
e Complete optical and surface analyses 
Boeing Aerospace & Electronics 
• Correlate our test results with NASA measurements 
from CAA primary structure 
• Confirm metallurgical findings on coating porosity 
• Scanning Transmission Electron Microscopy (STEM) 
• CAA thickness evaluation 
194 /7;); IlOftAUl· .. · ,. mm .' t4 i 
Optical Properties of Agrreflon 
The solar absorptance and thermal emittance of the Agrr eflon 
specimens tested to date show minimal changes. However, the 
diffuse reflectance of the Agrreflon exposed to atomic oxygen showed 
a large increase. This chart shows bidirectional reflectance 
distribution function (BRDF) curves for five specimens from trays 
located throughout LDEF. The closer the tray to the leading edge, the 
larger the increase in diffuse reflectance. The asymmetry in the 
curves is likely due to the anisotropy of the exposed Teflon surface. 
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BRDF of Ag{feflon LDEF Samples 
Comparison of exposed Ag{Teflon for five different locations 
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AgITeflon Recession Measurements 
Pre-flight (as manufactured) thickness of the first surface Teflon layer varied between 0.004" to 
0.006", making determination of the recession caused by the long term exposure to the LEO 
environment difficult. Three techniques have been used to measure recession. Weights of 
known areas were obtained for pairs of specimens, one from an exposed area and one from a 
nearby shielded area. The recession was then calculated from weight differences. These 
differences turned out to be within the variation possible given the material specifications, 
making this approach unsuitable. The second method was the examination of photomicrograph 
cross-sections to determine the thickness directly. The third technique was to locate 
particulate contaminants which protected the Teflon directly underneath. Using the protected 
location as the reference height, the depth of erosion was measured at sites adjacent to the 
protected area. This involved searching the surface with a microscope to find a protected site 
and measuring the depth change required to bring an adjacent eroded area into focus. The 
following chart shows the various recession of the Teflon vs tray location. The range of 
calculated recession rates (volume of Teflon recessed/calculated atomic oxygen fluence for that 
specific location) from all individual measurements to date is 0.05 to 0.38 x 10-24 cm3/atom. 
The variation in measured recession rates reflects the as manufactured thickness variations, 
the pot&ntial that specimens thought to be shielded may have received considerable atomic 
oxygen fluence, and that areas near the edge of exposed surfaces may have received 
enhanced fluence due to secondary scattering from nearby surfaces. 
The following chart shows exposed and shielded thickness of the Teflon for eight different 
locations on LDEF. These thicknesses were determined using the "third" technique. 
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Specimen Thickness (mils) 
Tray Location Exposed Shielded 
C11 4.6 5.0 
011 4.4 5.2 
Ai0 4.1 4.7 
07 4.8 5.0 
C6 5.3 5.0 
85 5.2 5.4 
A2 5.3 5.1 
01 5.2 - 5.4 
• Specimens exposed to atomic oxygen show recession 
• Specimens not exposed to atomic oxygen reflect 
variability in initial thickness of FEP 
198 
Boeing Aerospace 8. Electronics 
Thermal Control Coating Disks 
Thermal control coating disks consisting of Chemglaze A276 white paint and Chemglaze 
Z306 black paint were placed on tray clamps throughout LDEF. One of the major activities 
being undertaken at Boeing is to characterize the changes which have occurred with these 
coating disks as a function of their specific space exposure. The following status chart 
summarizes the analysis of these disks. 
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THERMAL CONTROL COATING DISKS 
• Atomic oxygen induced erosion effects are apparent to an incident angle of 
100 degrees. Optical properties of leading edge disks are still nominatl, 
mechanical properties have degraded. 
• Darkening of trailing edge white paint surfaces appears to be largely UV 
induced degradation of the paint resin with some additional effect from 
degraded surface contaminants. 
• To date, cross sectioning to determining erosion depths have been 
unsuccessfu I 
• Surface analysis indicates the presence of a contaminant film containing 
fluorine and silicon 
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FILMED 
BA ITERY ISOLAR CELLS 
A LiSQz Battery Distribution Plan was compiled by NASA-LaRC. Each investigator has 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NASA-LaRC. In the MOU, specific 
tasks and areas of investigation are identified. We reviewed the MOUs and suggested 
the addition of glass-to-metal seal corrosion. In other programs, this unique problem has 
developed the time involving lithium attack of the glass used to seal and electrically insulate 
the negative terminal from the cell case. This type of corrosion can stress the glass to crack 
and allow electrolyte, sulfur dioxide, to diffuse out of the cell. 
Solar cells from experiments on LDEF have been distributed to the responsible principal 
investigator for each experiment. A database is being compiled, which identifies the principal 
investigator and planned tests for solar cells and associated technologies, i.e., adhesives, 
coatings, cover glasses, and mechanical attachments. Investigators have been solicited 
to provide inputs for the data base to assure a complete overview of the tests and results. 
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Battery/So/ar Cells 
OBJECTIVE: 
• Identify degradation modes of batteries and solar 
cells useful to future missions 
BATIERIES: 
• Distribution Plan Complete 
• LiS02 • Aerospace Corp 20 
SAFT Corp 10 
NASA LeRC 1 
JPL (TRW) 3 
Naval Weapons Lab 8 
• LieF - NASA·MSFC 
• NiCd - NASA-Goddard 
• Memorandom of Agreement signed with each 
investigator 
SOLAR CELLS 
• Distribution completed 
• Testing and tasks being compiled into database 
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DATA ON lDEF BAlTERIES USEFUL TO OTHER PROGRAMS 
Lithium sulfur dioxide batteries are presently used on several space programs. These 
applications include: 1) Computer Memory Retention batteries for Boeing Inertial Upper 
Stage computers. 2) Primary batteries for Galileo mission, and 3) several SOl applications. 
The Li/S~ batteries have excellent capacity retention and can perform at temperatures as 
low as -40°C. Selection of the batteries for Galileo relied on the ability of the batteries to 
perform at low temperature and after long non-use times of transit. The use of U/SO 2 
batteries for speciality requirements of low temperature and long life will continue for many 
SOl programs. Information of the life expectancy in space use will aid these programs. 
Space use may result in less degradation than comparable earth storage, since the 
temperature environment in space can be at a lower nominal temperature. The lower 
temperature is expected to slow corrosion reactions believe to be responsible for leakage 
failure modes. 
Lithium carbon monoflouride (LiCF) batteries are of interest since they represent the 
chemistry used in the Shuttle booster batteries: 1) command distruct, 2) Frustrum location 
Aid, and 3) Payload Package. Batteries using this chemistry are also planned for the 
CIRRUS flight and SOl applications requiring low rate discharge. 
Nickel cadmium batteries have been and are being used on a variety of remote sensing and 
science related satellites operating in low Earth orbit. 
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Data on LDEF Batteries Useful 
to Other Programs 
LiSo.z III Batteries 
• Boeing IUS sa Computer Memory Retention Battery 
• Galileo.. ,." BAh batteries (multiple cells) 
• SOl Application 
LiCF - Batteries 
• CIRRUS .. 25Ah cells planned for batteries 
• Shuttle Booster - command destruct batteries 
NiCd - Batteries 
• Wide variety of remote sensing and science satellites 
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PRELIMINARY DAILY FLIGHT DATA 
This chart shows the temperatures of one of the batteries powering experiment 
S0069. The change in temperature was minimal indicating a benign environment 
for the batteries. The lithium batteries would be expected to perform well at these 
temperatures and would experience a minimal degradation. 
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PRELIMINARY TCSE DAILY FLIGHT DATA 
Battery #2 Temperature ~~ Temperature (OC) 
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STATUS OF BATTERY EVALUATION 
One Li/S~battery appears to have leaked. This battery was on Experiment 
#A0187-1. Sulfur dioxide, the active cathode electrode constituent of the cells, 
was detected when the battery test port was opened. One cell of the battery 
exhibited a low open circuit voltage typical of a depleted cell. The suspect cell 
has been sent to the original battery manufacturer, SAFT , for internal analysis. 
A discoloration was detected adjacent to the battery on the panel (note picture on 
next page). Chemical analysis of the deposit indicated an absence of sulfur. 
Since the sulfur dioxide was only detected upon opening the test port and the 
deposit lacks sulfur compounds, it is concluded that the battery cel/leakage was 
contained by the battery case. Additional information on the cell leakage will be 
available from the autopsy at SAFT. 
On experiments #S0069 and #S1 005 an odor was detected on opening the 
battery port. The odor was characteristic of the dimethyl sulfite electolyte used in 
the carbon monoflouride batteries of these experiments. More data will be 
provided from cell autopsy planned at NASA-MSFC. 
SAFT, under funding by the System SIG, has begun characterization of the ten 
LiS02 batteries distributed to them. These ten batteries possess various states 
of charge, ranging from near 1000/0 to fully depleted. Characterization has 
included: weights, X-ray, electrical, and opening of individual cells. All results, to 
date, are nominal. SAFT's final report is expected in March. 
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I 
Status of Battery Evaluation 
Experiment #A0181 .. 1 
G 502 detected when battery test port opened 
® One ceU of 1 e5V battery had low voltage 
• Suspect cen to be sent to SAFT for autopsy 
It Discoloration detected outside battery case 
e Chemical test indicate absence of sulfur 
• Indications DD no SO 2 outside battery case 
Experiment #S0069 and #S1005 (LiCF Batteries) 
1& Odor detected when battery case opened 
• Cells autopsy planned at NASA-MSFC 
SAFT evaluation of LiS02batteries 
CD SAFT is mfg of aU LiS02batteries flown on LDEF 
• To date, no anomalies have been found 
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PRECEDING 
FOllOW ON ACTIVITIES 
Battery distribution has been completed. Investigators have agreed to measure 
the capacity remaining in some of the battery cells to determine the state of charge. 
Some cells will be cut open to evaluate internal corrosion, which could indicate potential 
leakage problems. The glass-to-metal seal will be investigated for evidence of lithium 
attack and glass cracking. 
The solar cell data base will continue to grow as more experimental results are 
compiled. Information common to several investigators will be accumulate to indicate 
possible trends in degradation of the solar cells during space exposure. A surface 
analysis experiment is being proposed by Boeing to identify degradation due to phases 
of space exposure and earth handling. The surface analysis techniques used at Boeing 
to characterize the normal deposits seen on LDEF structure can be·used as a baseline 
to compare those observed on LDEF solar cells. Additional migration of contamination 
into the solar cell structure would be analyzed using a sensitive electron microprobe 
technique. Improved estimates obtained for degradation factors of solar cells would be 
useful for all space power applications using solar panels. 
The preliminary conclusions of the battery leakage analyses indicate that none of the 
batteries experienced external leakage, however some odors detected indicate internal 
cell leakage may have occurred. The battery case integrity contained the odors and 
prevented electrolyte from damaging hardware on LDEF. 
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Follow On Activities 
• Battery Distribution Completed 
• Residual capacity remaining 
• Evidence of degradation - corrosion 
and glass seal integrity 
• Solar Cells - Compiling database of experiments 
and investigator/tasks. Design experiments to 
identify solar cell contamination from space 
exposure versus earth and recovery 
'i 
Preliminary Conclusions: 
No evidence of leaky or failed battery in flight 
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